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PRUDENTIAL STANDING AFTER 
LEXMARK INTERNATIONAL, INC. 
V. STATIC CONTROL COMPONENTS, 
INC. 
ERNEST A. YOUNG 
INTRODUCTION 
In an October 2013 term featuring epic clashes over separation of 
powers, high-tech search and seizure, the federal treaty power, and 
freedom of religion, few paid much attention to an obscure standing 
case. That case, Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static Control 
Components, Inc.,1 concerned the parties entitled to bring suit for 
false advertising under the Lanham Act.2 In the course of resolving 
that question, however, Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court 
questioned the longstanding doctrine of “prudential” standing. What 
the Court actually did in Lexmark was unsurprising, and its analysis 
was not at bottom all that different from what courts had done for 
some time. But the majority’s discussion may spur far-reaching 
changes in how lawyers think and (especially) talk about standing. 
I.  JUSTICE SCALIA’S TREATISE ON PRUDENTIAL STANDING 
Lexmark was a case about laser-printer toner—the powdery ink 
that normally runs out right at the moment when one needs to print 
an important document for filing. Toner cartridges are expensive, and 
a considerable business has grown up around the refurbishment and 
resale of used cartridges. Lexmark sought to reserve this business to 
itself by requiring its customers to return used cartridges to it. Static 
Control, however, invented a microchip that enabled other companies 
to refurbish Lexmark’s cartridges.3 Lexmark sued Static Control 
 
Copyright © 2014 Ernest A. Young 
  Alston & Bird Professor of Law, Duke Law School.  
 1.  134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014). 
 2.  See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a) (West 2015). 
 3.  Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1384. 
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under federal copyright laws; Static Control counterclaimed under the 
Lanham Act, arguing that Lexmark had falsely advised its customers 
that Static Control’s chip was illegal and that it was therefore illegal 
to go to non-Lexmark remanufacturers for refurbishment.4 Lexmark 
moved to dismiss the counterclaim on the ground that Static Control 
lacked standing to bring a claim under the Act; the remanufacturers 
themselves, Static Control contended, would be a more direct 
plaintiff.5 The Court granted certiorari to determine “the appropriate 
analytical framework for determining a party’s standing to maintain 
an action for false advertising under the Lanham Act.”6 
Federal Courts professors traditionally have taught standing as 
including two sets of components—constitutional and prudential. The 
“‘irreducible constitutional minimum of standing,’” deriving from 
Article III’s “case or controversy” requirement, demands that “[t]he 
plaintiff must have suffered or be imminently threatened with a 
concrete and particularized ‘injury in fact’ that is fairly traceable to 
the challenged action of the defendant and likely to be redressed by a 
favorable judicial decision.”7 Lexmark conceded, and the Court 
agreed, that “Static Control’s allegations of lost sales and damage to 
its business reputation give it standing under Article III to press its 
false-advertising claim.”8 Debate thus focused on the second, 
“prudential” aspect of standing doctrine. That aspect has included 
three general requirements: “the general prohibition on a litigant’s 
raising another person’s legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of 
generalized grievances more appropriately addressed in the 
representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff’s 
complaint fall within the zone of interests protected by the law 
invoked.”9 These limitations have long been thought to “fit within a 
wide array of traditional doctrines of judicial self-governance, such as 
equitable discretion, abstention, and forum non conveniens.”10 
 
 4.  Id. 
 5.  Id. at 1835. 
 6.  Id. (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. 1377 (2014) (No. 
12-837), 2013 WL 166412, at *i.). 
 7.  Id. at 1386 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)); see 
generally RICHARD H. FALLON, JR., JOHN F. MANNING, DANIEL J. MELTZER, & DAVID L. 
SHAPIRO, HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 113–27 
(6th ed. 2009). 
 8.  Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1386. 
 9.  Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 12 (2004) (quoting Allen v. 
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)). 
 10.  HART & WECHSLER, supra note 7, at 128.  
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Because they do not derive (at least directly) from Article III, the 
prudential rules can be overridden by broad legislative grants of 
standing to sue.11 
Lexmark, however, called this structure into question. Finding the 
label of prudential standing “misleading,” Justice Scalia undertook to 
“clarify[] the nature of the question at issue in this case.”12 He noted 
that prudential standing has always been in tension with the principle 
that “a federal court’s obligation to hear and decide cases within its 
jurisdiction is virtually unflagging.”13 He might well have added that 
prudential standing doctrines are often challenged as judge-made law, 
existing in Griswoldian “penumbras” of Article III.14 In any event, 
Scalia noted that the aspect of prudence at issue in Lexmark—the 
“zone-of-interests” test—has always been concerned with Congress’s 
intent in enacting the law in question.15 The Court quoted Judge 
Silberman’s observation that “prudential standing is a misnomer” in 
zone-of-interest cases, because the doctrine inquires whether “this 
particular class of persons ha[s] a right to sue under this substantive 
statute.”16 
Setting aside the “prudential standing” rubric, Justice Scalia 
concluded that 
the question this case presents is whether Static Control falls 
within the class of plaintiffs whom Congress has authorized to sue 
under § 1125(a). In other words, we ask whether Static Control has 
a cause of action under the statute. That question requires us to 
 
 11.  See, e.g., FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 19–20 (1998). 
 12.  Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1386. 
 13.  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. 
Ct. 584, 591 (2013)).  
 14.  Justice Scalia made just that point in a well-known law review article over three 
decades ago. See Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the 
Separation of Powers, 17 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 881, 885 (1983). For a more recent version of the 
criticism, see S. Todd Brown, The Story of Prudential Standing, 42 HASTINGS CON. L. Q. 95, 116 
(2014).  
 15.  The Court has sometimes applied zone-of-interest-like analysis to constitutional 
provisions. It has held, for example, that the Fourth Amendment generally protects the privacy 
interests of the owner of a property but often does not extend to her guests. See, e.g., Minnesota 
v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83, 89–91 (1998). Persons other than the property owner, in other words, 
often fall outside the Amendment’s zone of interests. Debate about whether corporations have 
standing to invoke provisions like the First Amendment also fall into this category. See, e.g., 
Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). Analysis in such cases has generally focused not on 
general principles of standing but rather on the substantive content and intent of the provision 
at issue—much as in the statutory cases. 
 16.  Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 (alteration in original) (quoting Ass’n of Battery 
Recyclers, Inc. v. EPA, 716 F.3d 667, 675–76 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (concurring opinion)). 
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determine the meaning of the congressionally enacted provision 
creating a cause of action. In doing so, we apply traditional 
principles of statutory interpretation. . . . Just as a court cannot 
apply its independent policy judgment to recognize a cause of 
action that Congress has denied . . . it cannot limit a cause of action 
that Congress has created merely because ‘prudence’ dictates.17 
Despite reframing this as a statutory question rather than one of 
“prudential standing,” the Court applied the same “zone of interests” 
analysis that it had pursued in prior cases, asking whether Static 
Control fell “within the zone of interests protected by the law 
invoked.”18 The Court found rather easily that it did, noting that 
“Static Control’s alleged injuries—lost sales and damage to its 
business reputation—are injuries to precisely the sorts of commercial 
interests the Act protects.”19 The Court also inquired—apparently as a 
second element of construing the scope of the Act’s cause of action—
whether Static Control’s injuries were “proximately caused by 
violations of the statute.”20 Static Control satisfied this test as well, 
even though it was not the direct target of Lexmark’s allegedly false 
representation. Having alleged “that it designed, manufactured, and 
sold microchips that both (1) were necessary for, and (2) had no other 
use than, refurbishing Lexmark toner cartridges,” it followed “that 
any false advertising that reduced the remanufacturers’ business 
necessarily injured Static Control as well.”21 
Lexmark was unanimous as to both result and rationale. With 
respect to the result, the case seems relatively straightforward; the 
interesting questions arise from the Court’s explicit shift away from 
the traditional rubric of prudential standing. That shift raises a 
number of questions that are likely to bedevil the lower courts. 
II. STANDING QUESTIONS AFTER LEXMARK 
Writing in 1988, Professor (now judge) William Fletcher 
reinterpreted standing doctrine as grounded in the substance of the 
plaintiff’s claim—not in general principles emanating from Article 
III.22 “Standing,” Fletcher wrote, “should simply be a question on the 
 
 17.  Id. at 1387–88 (citing Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286–87 (2001), on the 
illegitimacy of courts creating new causes of action). 
 18.  Id. at 1388 (quoting Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984)). 
 19.  Id. at 1393. 
 20.  Id. at 1390–91. 
 21.  Id. at 1394. 
 22.  William A. Fletcher, The Structure of Standing, 98 YALE L.J. 221 (1988). For a recent 
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merits of plaintiff’s claim;” hence, “[t]he essence of a true standing 
question is the following: Does the plaintiff have a legal right to 
judicial enforcement of an asserted legal duty?”23 It followed that 
“[t]his question should be seen as a question of substantive law, 
answerable by reference to the statutory or constitutional provision 
whose protection is invoked.”24 Fletcher urged that this inquiry should 
replace the traditional constitutional requirements courts had found 
in Article III, such as injury-in-fact, and that position remains heresy 
at the Supreme Court. But one may fairly read Lexmark as adopting 
Fletcher’s analysis for purposes of prudential standing. The thrust of 
Justice Scalia’s opinion, after all, is to replace general, judge-made 
notions of prudence with a substantive inquiry into the intent of 
particular statutory provisions. 
This is a significant shift in how the Court talks about standing. It 
is likely to raise a number of questions. 
A. Will Lexmark Govern Other Aspects of Prudential Standing? 
As already noted, the zone-of-interests test upon which the Court 
focused in Lexmark has always been a question of the substantive 
intent behind the particular legal provision forming the basis of the 
plaintiff’s underlying claim. As such, Judge Fletcher’s substantive 
vision of standing is a natural fit for the zone-of-interests doctrine. It 
is less clear, however, how that vision can apply to more general 
principles, such as the general prohibition on third-party standing or 
the bar to generalized grievances. These, after all, have been seen as 
generally-applicable requirements. 
The Court addressed these other aspects of traditional prudential 
standing in a footnote.25  Justice Scalia suggested that cases raising 
“generalized grievances” are actually “barred for constitutional 
reasons, not ‘prudential’ ones.”26 That statement arguably overlooked 
cases like FEC v. Akins,27 in which the Court seemed to suggest that 
the constitutional “concrete injury” and the prudential “no 
generalized grievances” principles were related but distinct.  Akins 
rejected a prudential challenge to standing on the ground that 
 
symposium on this seminal article, see Heather Elliott, The Structure of Standing at 25: 
Introduction to the Symposium, 65 ALA. L. REV. 269 (2013). 
 23.  Id. at 223, 229. 
 24.  Id. at 229. 
 25.  See Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 n.3. 
 26.  Id. 
 27.  524 U.S. 11 (1998). 
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Congress had specifically conferred a statutory right to sue on the 
plaintiff, thereby obviating any prudential hurdles to standing.28 It 
nonetheless considered the Government’s argument that plaintiff had 
only a “generalized grievance,” noting that the precedents 
inconsistently referred to this objection in (sometimes) constitutional 
and (sometimes) prudential terms.29 In considering this argument, 
however, Justice Breyer’s majority opinion focused on whether the 
plaintiff’s injury was too “abstract”30—a requirement more in keeping 
with the constitutional notion of “concrete injury.” That would seem 
to leave room for a prudential principle of “generalized grievance” 
that, as the Court said in Warth v. Seldin, comes into play “when the 
asserted harm is . . . shared in substantially equal measure by all or a 
large class of citizens.”31 To complicate matters further, Justice Scalia’s 
dissent in Akins focused not on whether the plaintiff’s injury was 
“concrete” but rather upon whether it is “undifferentiated” from the 
injury shared by many others.32 But again, this would leave room for a 
prudential category of “generalized grievance”—not at issue in 
Akins—for injuries that are simply widely shared. 
Prior to Lexmark, then, one could plausibly view the 
constitutional “concrete injury” requirement and the prudential bar 
on “generalized grievances” as protecting similar values, but to 
different degrees. Both were designed to prevent the courts from 
intervening in broad controversies better suited to the political 
branches. But the recognition of a constitutional core within a 
prudential penumbra allowed Congress flexibility to permit claims by 
a broad class of persons so long as their injuries were sufficiently 
concrete. Justice Scalia’s more recent comment in Lexmark is plainly 
dictum, but it strongly suggests that there may simply be no more 
“generalized grievance” rule distinct from the constitutional 
minimum of a “concrete injury.” 
 
The Court admitted, however, that “[t]he limitations on third-
party standing are harder to classify,” although it pointed out that 
prior cases had seen third-party standing as “closely related to the 
 
 28.  See id. at 19. 
 29.  See id. at 23. 
 30.  See id. at 23–24. 
 31.  422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975). 
 32.  See Akins, 524 U.S. at 35 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  Justice Scalia pointed out that when 
many people suffer similar injuries in a mass tort—physical burns, for example—each person’s 
injury is differentiated and particular to them, even if others suffer similar harm. See id.  
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question whether a person in the litigant’s position will have a right of 
action on the claim.”33 A line of cases under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does 
treat third-party issues just this way: In asking whether beneficiaries 
of a federal spending condition may enforce that condition by a 
private suit against state or local officials, the Court has explicitly 
imported its analysis of private rights of action from Alexander v. 
Sandoval34 and similar cases.35 These cases suggest third-party standing 
issues can likewise be handled as issues primarily of Congress’s intent 
with respect to particular statutory schemes. 
What about the Court’s more exotic prudential rules?  In Elk 
Grove Unified School District v. Newdow,36 for example, the Court 
held that the father of a student in public school lacked standing to 
challenge the school district’s policy of reciting the Pledge of 
Allegiance to open each school day. The trouble was that the child’s 
mother—who had sole legal custody under state law—opposed the 
suit and argued that it would undermine the child’s best interests. This 
precluded the father from suing as his daughter’s “next friend” and 
forced him to rely on an injury to his own right to inculcate his 
atheistic beliefs in his child.  The extent of that right was murky in this 
circumstance, however, given the mother’s conflicting prerogatives 
and the possible threat to the child’s best interests.37 Not entirely 
surprisingly, the Court punted, holding that “it is improper for the 
federal courts to entertain a claim by a plaintiff whose standing to sue 
is founded on family law rights that are in dispute when prosecution 
of the lawsuit may have an adverse effect on the person who is the 
source of the plaintiff’s claimed standing.”38 
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence in Newdow criticized the 
majority for recognizing a “novel prudential standing principle” 
applicable to cases touching on domestic relations.39 The case may be 
better read, however, as an acknowledgment that despite the 
crystallization of particular prudential standing doctrines—such as the 
zone-of-interests test or the third-party rule—the courts retain a more 
 
 33.  134 S. Ct. at 1387 n.3 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Labor v. Triplett, 494 U.S. 715, 721 
(1990)). 
 34.  532 U.S. 275 (2001). 
 35.  See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002); Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 
329 (1997); Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347 (1992); see generally HART & WECHSLER, supra 
note 7, at 968–69. 
 36.  542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
 37.  See id. at 13–17. 
 38.  Id. at 17. 
 39.  Id. at 18 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment). 
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general discretion to dismiss cases on case-specific prudential 
grounds.40 In Newdow, those grounds included a federalism-based 
respect for the state’s primary authority over the crucial family law 
principles involved,41 as well as the imperative to avoid decision of a 
difficult constitutional question under the Religion Clauses.42 
Whatever one thinks of cases like Newdow, it is impossible to 
assimilate them either to questions of congressional intent (as 
Lexmark did with zone of interests and as might be done for third-
party standing) or to the constitutional requirement of a “case or 
controversy.”  And for reasons I explore further below, the Court is 
unlikely to abandon prudential reasoning altogether. 
B. Has the Court Created a New Rule of Prudential Standing? 
Traditional accounts of prudential standing feature three general 
requirements: (1) the rule against third-party standing; (2) the 
prohibition on generalized grievances; and (3) the zone-of-interests 
test. The Court has occasionally come up with additional, more 
particularistic principles, such as Newdow’s rule against conferring 
standing where it would interfere with principles of state family law.43 
But the Court’s treatment of proximate causation in Lexmark seemed 
to recognize a principle of general applicability that had not been part 
of the Court’s prudential standing doctrine. Justice Scalia wrote that 
“we generally presume that a statutory cause of action is limited to 
plaintiffs whose injuries are proximately caused by violations of the 
statute.” This principle, he said, “has been ‘a well established principle 
of [the common] law” “[f]or centuries,” and it is part of the legal 
background against which Congress is presumed to legislate.44 
 
 40.  Cf. David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543 (1985) 
(distinguishing between judicial discretion to adopt general rules limiting jurisdiction and case-
by-case discretion not to hear particular cases). 
 41.  See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 12–13 (majority opinion) (noting, inter alia, the “‘domestic 
relations exception’ that ‘divests the federal courts of power to issue divorce, alimony, and child 
custody decrees’”) (quoting Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 703 (1992)).  
 42.  See id. at 17 (“When hard questions of domestic relations are sure to affect the 
outcome, the prudent course is for the federal court to stay its hand rather than reach out to 
resolve a weighty question of federal constitutional law.”). 
 43.  See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 (2004); see also HART & 
WECHSLER, supra note 7, at 128. 
 44.  Lexmark Inter’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1390 
(alteration in original) (quoting Waters v. Merchants’ Louisville Ins. Co., 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 213, 
223 (1837)). For an empirical study assessing the extent to which Members of Congress and 
their staff actually know and rely on such background principles, see Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa 
Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of 
Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2013); Lisa 
YOUNG FINAL READ (DO NOT DELETE) 10/21/2015  2:27 PM 
2014] PRUDENTIAL STANDING AFTER LEXMARK 157 
This is hardly an outlandish requirement, and the Court did not 
apply it particularly strictly in Lexmark. But the Court had never 
mentioned it before as a part of prudential standing doctrine. Neither 
does it feature prominently in the Court’s jurisprudence concerning 
the existence and scope of private rights of action under federal 
statutes. That jurisprudence, in its permissive days, focused on the 
statute’s underlying policy; nowadays, in a more restrictive vein, it 
looks to statutory text.45 Only time will tell whether the Court’s 
identification of proximate causation as a generally applicable limit 
on federal statutory causes of action will provide a new line of attack 
for defendants. 
The Lexmark Court’s treatment of proximate causation does 
suggest that the Court may hang onto the notion of general rules of 
non-constitutional standing—whether it calls them “prudential” or 
not. The trouble with an approach grounded entirely in Congress’s 
substantive intent with respect to particular statutes is that that intent 
is frequently opaque or nonexistent. Congress frequently does not 
specify exactly whom it wishes to be able to sue, even when it 
expressly creates a private right of action. In such cases, most of the 
work of interpretation will be done by default rules—general 
presumptions concerning what Congress would have wanted if it had 
confronted the problem explicitly.46 Justice Scalia’s opinion in 
Lexmark characterized its proximate causation analysis in just this 
way: “Congress, we assume, is familiar with the common-law rule 
[limiting plaintiffs to those whose injuries are proximately caused by 
the legal violation] and does not mean to displace it sub silentio.”47 
The requirement of proximate causation thus functions as a general 
rule of non-constitutional standing applicable across statutory 
schemes, unless Congress specifically displaces it.48 
Ironically, the Court’s discussion of proximate causation in 
Lexmark may have the unintended consequence of loosening the 
causation element of constitutional standing. Article III requires not 
 
Schultz Bressman & Abbe R. Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical 
Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725 
(2014). 
 45.  See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 7, at 705–07. 
 46.  See Ernest A. Young, In Praise of Judge Fletcher—And of General Standing Principles, 
65 ALA. L. REV. 473, 481 (2013). 
 47.  Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1390. 
 48.  See generally Young, supra note 46 (arguing that not all standing rules can be derived 
from the underlying statutes or other legal norms sued upon in particular cases). 
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only a concrete injury in fact, but that this injury be “fairly traceable” 
to the challenged conduct and “redressable” by the requested relief.49 
Both of these elements fall under the rubric of causation—traceability 
is causation running backward from the plaintiff’s injury to the 
challenged conduct, while redressability is causation running forward 
from a judicial order ending the case to the remediation of the 
original injury. In Lexmark, Justice Scalia commented that 
“[p]roximate causation is not a requirement of Article III standing, 
which requires only that the plaintiff’s injury be fairly traceable to the 
defendant’s conduct.”50 That statement strongly suggests what might 
not otherwise have occurred to most observers, which is that the 
Article III causation standard must be something kinder and gentler 
to plaintiffs than proximacy. 
C. Will the Court’s Restrictive Implied Rights of Action Jurisprudence 
Creep into the Zone-of-Interests Analysis? 
Lexmark’s analysis of whether Static Control’s claim fits within 
the Lanham Act’s zone of interests was fairly conventional. What was 
new was the Court’s relocation of zone-of-interest analysis from an 
aspect of standing to a question of the scope of the plaintiff’s 
underlying cause of action. That relocation will be of interest 
primarily to academics—unless and until it turns out to affect the 
test’s application. 
There is some reason to think that it might. In particular, the 
Court’s analysis of private rights of action has become increasingly 
strict in recent years. The Court has imposed a virtual moratorium on 
the recognition of new implied rights of action,51 repeatedly refused to 
expand the scope of previously-recognized implied rights under both 
federal statutes and the Constitution,52 and even extended its 
 
 49.  See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). 
 50.  Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1391 n.6. 
 51.  See Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 7, at 
705–11. 
 52.  See, e.g., Cent. Bank of Denver, N.A. v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, N.A., 511 
U.S. 164, 190–91 (1994) (rejecting calls to extend the implied private right of action under SEC 
Rule 10b–5 to aiders and abettors); Stoneridge Inv. Partners, LLC v. Scientific-Atlanta, Inc., 552 
U.S. 148, 165 (2008) (observing that “[c]oncerns with the judicial creation of a private cause of 
action caution against its expansion. The decision to extend the cause of action is for Congress, 
not for us”); Minneci v. Pollard, 132 S. Ct. 617, 620 (2012) (rejecting an effort to extend Bivens 
to cover an Eighth Amendment claim against employees of a privately operated federal prison); 
Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 562 (2007) (rejecting a request to extend Bivens to cover 
harassment and intimidation of the plaintiff by the Bureau of Land Management); see generally 
Corr. Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 68 (2001) (noting that since 1980, the Court has 
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restrictive approach to express statutory causes of action.53 If future 
development of the zone-of-interests test takes place in this 
environment, that test may well be construed more restrictively. 
Significantly, the Lexmark Court confined the import of prior 
statements that the zone-of-interests test is “not especially 
demanding” to claims brought under the Administrative Procedure 
Act and emphasized that “the breadth of the zone of interests varies 
according to the provisions of law at issue.”54 This language strongly 
implied that the Court might not be so generous in other contexts—as 
did its earlier citation to Alexander v. Sandoval,55 the Rehnquist 
Court’s leading decision cutting back on implied rights of action. 
D. What Other Effects Will Making Prudential Standing Concerns 
Part of the Merits Have? 
The Lexmark opinion identified one important effect of relocating 
the concerns previously considered under prudential standing to 
become part of substantive analysis of the plaintiff’s cause of action. 
Justice Scalia noted that “the absence of a valid (as opposed to 
arguable) cause of action does not implicate subject-matter 
jurisdiction, i.e., the court’s statutory or constitutional power to 
adjudicate the case.”56 This has a number of important effects. 
Procedurally, a defendant’s motion to dismiss based on zone-of-
interests arguments should rest on Federal Rule 12(b)(6), not 
12(b)(1), which deals with lack of jurisdiction. As a non-jurisdictional 
argument, zone of interests may not be raised at any point in the 
litigation, but must be timely advanced like other merits contentions. 
And while courts may not employ “hypothetical standing” to avoid a 
difficult Article III question by resolving the case on an easier merits 
argument,57 they will be able to postpone consideration of zone of 
interests (and possibly other prudential standing-type arguments) in 
this way. 
 
“consistently refused to extend Bivens liability to any new context or new category of 
defendants”). 
 53.  See, e.g., Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002); Middlesex Cnty. Sewerage Auth. 
v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n, 453 U.S. 1 (1981); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 7, at 968–72. 
 54.  Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1389 (quoting Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band of 
Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 132  S. Ct. 2199, 2210 (2012), and Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 
154, 163 (1997)).  
 55.  532 U.S. 275 (2001) (cited at 134 S. Ct. at 1388). 
 56.  Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1387 n.4 (quoting Verizon Md. Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of 
Md., 535 U.S. 635, 642–43 (2002).  
 57.  See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94 (1998). 
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Perhaps a more surprising consequence would affect federal 
causes of action litigated in state court. Prudential standing, after all, 
has generally been justified as part of the federal courts’ inherent 
authority to control litigation of cases that come before them, as well 
as a penumbra-like outgrowth of Article III itself. That sort of 
principle would, of course, be limited to federal court; state courts are 
not subject either to Article III or the inherent authority of federal 
judges. And many states have taken advantage of this fact to offer 
broader standing rules that, for example, permit questions of public 
import to be more readily litigated by a broader class of parties or 
even served up for advisory opinions.58 
If principles previously considered part of prudential standing—
like zone of interests or the restriction on third parties—are instead 
part of the underlying federal cause of action, then they are 
substantive law binding on the state courts. Plainly, if Lexmark had 
come out the other way on the merits, no state court would have been 
free to hear Sonic Control’s counterclaim on the theory that its state 
law took a broader view of standing. The claim would simply not have 
been actionable under the Lanham Act, in any forum.59 Questions 
might also arise whether state courts may take a narrower view of 
standing in areas previously thought to be governed by prudential 
principles. After all, state courts generally may not decline to hear 
federal claims under the rule of Testa v. Katt.60 It is possible that a 
state’s restrictive standing rules might be considered a generally-
applicable “valid excuse”—a longstanding exception to Testa61—but 
this is far from certain. And state court rulings on questions like the 
zone of interests covered by federal statutes will now be appealable to 
the U.S. Supreme Court. 
 
 
 58.  See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 7, at 126–27. 
 59.  One might still raise such a claim if the federal-law violation could be incorporated as 
an element in a state-law cause of action. Cf. Merrell Dow Pharm. Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 
804 (1986) (involving a state-law tort claim employing violation of a federal regulatory standard 
to establish the element of fault). 
 60.  330 U.S. 386 (1947). 
 61.  See, e.g., Missouri ex rel. S. Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950); Douglas v. New York, 
N.H. & H.R. Co., 279 U.S. 377 (1929); see generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 7, at 449–
50 (discussing the “valid excuse” doctrine). 
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E. Will the Court’s Aversion to Prudential Rules Extend Beyond 
Standing? 
Critics of the prudential standing doctrines frequently assert that 
“a federal court’s obligation to hear and decide cases within its 
jurisdiction is virtually unflagging.”62 The canonical “unflagging 
obligation” language first appeared in Colorado River Conservation 
District v. United States,63 but the general idea traces much further 
back to Chief Justice Marshall’s even-more-canonical statement in 
Cohens v. Virginia that “[w]e have no more right to decline the 
exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not 
given. The one or the other would be treason to the constitution.”64 
Yet the pedigree of these statements is highly instructive. Colorado 
River is a famous abstention case in which the federal courts declined 
to exercise their jurisdiction.65 And Cohens is a sovereign immunity 
case, construing a principle that deprives federal courts of jurisdiction 
in a wide variety of circumstances (and which is notoriously difficult 
to square with the constitutional text).66 If the federal courts’ 
jurisdictional obligations are to be truly “unflagging,” a great deal of 
established doctrine will have to go besides prudential standing. 
Consider, for example, the other justiciability doctrines besides 
standing. Although the Supreme Court has grounded the ripeness 
requirement in Article III’s “case or controversy” requirement,67 
ripeness generally turns on a flexible inquiry concerning “the fitness 
of the issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of 
withholding court consideration.”68  These factors derive in part from 
equitable considerations and are largely prudential in nature; 
moreover, the Court has suggested that some ripeness concerns may 
be overridden by statutes directing speedy adjudication.69 
Similarly, although the mootness doctrine has been aptly 
described as inquiring whether the plaintiff retains the concrete injury 
 
 62.  Lexmark Inter’l, Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1386 (internal 
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S. Ct. 584, 591 (2013)). 
See also Brown, supra note 14, at 100. 
 63.  424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976). 
 64.  19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 403 (1821). 
 65.  See Colo. River, 424 U.S. at 806; see generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 7, at 
1135–40. 
 66.  See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 7, at 878–85. 
 67.  See, e.g., Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 297 (1979); 
United Pub. Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947). 
 68.  Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967). 
 69.  See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 117 (1976). 
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that gave him standing when the case was filed,70 it likewise 
incorporates significant prudential elements. Important exceptions to 
the mootness doctrine turn on prudential concerns about the conduct 
of litigation, such as the need to permit adjudication of claims that 
expire quickly71 or to facilitate resolution of claims on a class-wide 
basis.72 As Chief Justice Rehnquist observed almost three decades ago, 
“[t]he logical conclusion to be drawn from these cases, and from the 
historical development of the principle of mootness, is that while an 
unwillingness to decide moot cases may be connected to the case or 
controversy requirement of Art. III, it is an attenuated connection 
that may be overridden where there are strong reasons to override 
it.”73 
Mootness and ripeness are both, in other words, mostly prudential 
in nature.  Nor are they the only other examples where the federal 
courts have found their obligation to decide cases within their 
constitutional and statutory jurisdiction to be, well, flagging.  The 
various abstention doctrines permit or require federal courts to defer 
to state courts in various contexts, based on considerations of comity, 
federalism, constitutional avoidance, and judicial efficiency.74 The act 
of state doctrine, which prevents domestic courts from reviewing the 
legality of an official act of a foreign government within its own 
territory, rests largely on prudential concerns about judicial 
interference with the foreign policy of the political branches.75 Federal 
 
 70.  See Henry P. Monaghan, Constitutional Adjudication: The Who and When, 82 YALE 
L.J. 1363, 1384 (1973) (characterizing mootness as “the doctrine of standing set in a time frame: 
The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) 
must continue throughout its existence (mootness)”). 
 71.  See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973) (recognizing an exception where an 
issue is “capable of repetition, yet evading review”); see also Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 330 
(1988) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (“If our mootness doctrine were forced upon us by the case 
or controversy requirement of Art. III itself, we would have no more power to decide lawsuits 
which are ‘moot’ but which also raise questions which are capable of repetition but evading 
review than we would to decide cases which are ‘moot’ but raise no such questions.”). 
 72.  See, e.g., U.S. Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980). 
 73.  Honig, 484 U.S. at 331 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). 
 74.  See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976) 
(requiring abstention where parallel state and federal litigation would massively waste 
resources); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (requiring federal courts to abstain to avoid 
interference with pending state criminal proceedings); R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 
U.S. 496 (1941) (requiring abstention where an unsettled question of federal constitutional law 
may be avoided depending on the resolution, by a state court, of an unsettled state law 
question). 
 75.  See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); see generally Ernest A. 
Young, The Story of Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino: Federal Judicial Power in Foreign 
Relations Cases, in FEDERAL COURTS STORIES 415, 436–38 (Vicki C. Jackson & Judith Resnik 
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courts have asserted discretion to create exceptions to Congress’s 
general provision for subject matter jurisdiction over cases “arising 
under” federal law, based on prudential judgments about the strength 
of federal interests and the likely impact on federal caseloads.76 And 
the federal courts routinely dismiss habeas corpus petitions filed by 
state prisoners who have failed to present their claims to the state 
courts, notwithstanding that such dismissals rest on prudential 
concerns about federalism rather than jurisdictional restrictions.77 
It is highly doubtful that all of this doctrine is to go by the wayside 
in the wake of Lexmark. Judges have always formulated rules for the 
decision of cases that constrain their powers more narrowly than 
external sources—constitutional and statutory jurisdictional 
provisions—would permit. But if that is true, then the Court will need 
to explain why its concerns about judge-made prudential rules are 
more pressing in some areas than in others. Justice Scalia was surely 
right to ground the zone-of-interests doctrine more squarely in 
Congress’s intent, and that no doubt explains Lexmark’s unanimity. 
One strongly suspects that a general assault on other prudential 
doctrines, such as the ones noted above, would prove considerably 
more controversial. 
CONCLUSION 
One is tempted to suggest that Scalia’s “clarifying” discussion of 
standing in Lexmark has done precisely the opposite. That would be 
unfair, however. Ever since Judge Fletcher’s seminal article, it has 
been an open secret of standing law that standing is not—as the Court 
frequently protests—entirely divorced from the merits of the 
plaintiff’s claims. By acknowledging that fact, at least with respect to 
prudential standing, Lexmark does hold out hope of placing standing 
doctrine generally on a firmer footing. At the same time, the Court 
will need to recognize that it cannot do without prudential rules 
entirely. Then the hard work of specifying which prudential rules are 
legitimate, which are not, and why can begin. 
 
eds., 2010) (comparing act of state to other prudential doctrines). Like other prudential 
doctrines, the act of state principle can be overridden by statute. See, e.g., 23 U.S.C.A. § 2370 
(West 2015). 
 76.  See, e.g., Gunn v. Minton, 133 S. Ct. 1059 (2013); Grable & Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. 
Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 308 (2005). 
 77.  See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977); see also HART & WECHSLER, supra 
note 7, at 1281–83. 
